A political program to exit Iraq

A political program to exit Iraq
By Henry A. Kissinger Tribune Media Services
Copyright by The Interenational Herald Tribune
Published: July 2, 2007


The war in Iraq is approaching a kind of self-imposed climax. Public disenchantment is palpable. Congress will surely press for an accelerated, if not total, withdrawal of American forces. Demands for a political solution are likely to mount.

But precipitate withdrawal would produce a disaster. It would not end the war but shift it to other areas, like Lebanon or Jordan or Saudi Arabia. The war between the Iraqi factions would intensify. The demonstration of American impotence would embolden radical Islamism and further radicalize its disciples from Indonesia and India to the suburbs of European capitals.

We face a number of paradoxes. Military victory, in the sense of establishing a government capable of enforcing its writ throughout Iraq, is not possible in a time frame tolerated by the American political process. Yet no political solution is conceivable in isolation from the situation on the ground.

What America and the world need is not unilateral withdrawal but a vision by the administration of a sustainable political end to the conflict. Withdrawals must grow out of a political solution, not the other way around.

None of Iraq's neighbors, not even Iran, is in a position to dominate the situation against the opposition of all the other interested parties. Is it possible to build a sustainable outcome on such considerations?

The answer must be sought on three levels: the internal, the regional and the international.

The internal parties - the Shiites, the Sunnis and the Kurds - have been subjected to insistent American appeals to achieve national reconciliation. But groups that have been conducting blood feuds with one another for centuries are, not surprisingly, struggling in their efforts to compose their differences by constitutional means. They need the buttress of a diplomatic process that could provide international support for carrying out any internal agreements reached or to contain their conflict if the internal parties cannot agree and Iraq breaks up.

The American goal should be an international agreement regarding the international status of Iraq. It would test whether the neighbors of Iraq as well as some more distant countries are prepared to translate general concepts into converging policies. It would provide a legal and political framework to resist violations. These are the meaningful benchmarks against which to test American withdrawals.

The reason why such a diplomacy may prove feasible is that the continuation of Iraq's current crisis presents all of Iraq's neighbors with mounting problems. The longer the war in Iraq rages, the more likely will be the breakup of the country into sectarian units.

Turkey has repeatedly emphasized that it would resist such a breakup by force because of the radicalizing impact that a Kurdish state could have on Turkey's large Kurdish population. But this would bring Turkey into unwanted conflict with the United States and open a Pandora's box of other interventions.

Saudi Arabia and Jordan dread Shiite domination of Iraq, especially if the Baghdad regime threatens to become a satellite of Iran. The various Gulf sheikhdoms, the largest of which is Kuwait, find themselves in an even more threatened position. Syria's attitudes are likely to be more ambivalent. Its ties to Iran represent both a claim to status and a looming vulnerability.

Given a wise and determined American diplomacy, even Iran may be brought to conclude that the risks of continued turmoil outweigh the temptations before it.

To be sure, Iranian leaders may believe that the wind is at their backs, that the moment is uniquely favorable to realize millennial visions of a reincarnated Persian empire or a reversal of the Shiite-Sunni split under Shiite domination. On the other hand, if prudent leaders exist - which remains to be determined - they might come to the conclusion that they had better treat these advantages as a bargaining chip in a negotiation rather than risk them in a contest over domination of the region.

No American president will, in the end, acquiesce once the full consequences of Iranian domination of the region become apparent. Russia will have its own reasons, principally the fear of the radicalization of its own Islamic minority, to begin resisting Iranian and radical Islamist domination of the Gulf. Combined with the international controversy over its nuclear weapons program, Iran's challenge could come to be perceived by its leaders to pose excessive risks.

Whether or whenever Iran reaches these conclusions, two conditions will have to be met: First, no serious diplomacy can be based on the premise that the United States is the supplicant. America and its allies must demonstrate a determination to vindicate their vital interests that Iran will find credible. Second, the United States will need to put forward a diplomatic position that acknowledges the legitimate security interests of Iran.

Such a negotiation must be initiated within a genuinely multilateral forum. A dramatic bilateral Iranian-U.S. negotiation would magnify all the region's insecurities. For if Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait - which have entrusted their security primarily to the United States - become convinced that an Iranian-U.S. condominium is looming, a race for Tehran's favor may bring about the disintegration of all resolve.

Within a multilateral framework, the United States will be able to conduct individual conversations with the key participants, as has happened in the six-party forum on North Korea.

A forum for such an effort already exists in the foreign ministers' conference that met recently at Sharm el-Sheikh. It is in the United States' interest to turn the conference into a working enterprise under strong, if discreet, American leadership.

The purpose of such a forum should be to define the international status of the emerging Iraqi political structure into a series of reciprocal obligations. Iraq would continue to evolve as a sovereign state but agree to place itself under some international restraint in return for specific guarantees.

In such a scheme, the United States-led multinational force would be gradually transformed into an agent of that arrangement, along the lines of the Bosnian settlement in the Balkans.

All this suggests a three-tiered international effort: an intensified negotiation among the Iraqi parties; a regional forum like the Sharm el-Sheikh conference to elaborate an international transition status for Iraq; and a broader conference to establish the peacekeeping and verification dimensions. The rest of the world cannot indefinitely pretend to be bystanders to a process that could engulf them through their default.

Neither the international system nor American public opinion will accept as a permanent arrangement an American enclave maintained exclusively by American military power in so volatile a region. The concept outlined here seeks to establish a new international framework for Iraq. It is an outcome emerging from a political and military situation on the ground and not from artificial deadlines.

Henry A. Kissinger heads the consulting firm Kissinger & Associates. This article was distributed by Tribune Media Services.